On October 20, China accused a U.S. naval vessel of “undermining regional stability” by coming into waters close to Sabina Shoal within the Spratly Islands. In response to a spokesperson for the Individuals’s Liberation Military’s Southern Theater Command Navy, the U.S. Littoral Fight Ship USS Charleston (LCS-18) “illegally intruded” into waters adjoining to Sabina Shoal “with out approval from the Chinese language authorities.” Against this, a U.S. Navy seventh Fleet spokesperson maintained that the Charleston performed “routine operations in worldwide waters” according to worldwide legislation.
This newest naval encounter displays the long-standing authorized dispute between China and the U.S. over the liberty of navigation of warships within the South China Sea. What makes it distinct is the placement of the incident: in contrast to all earlier U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) focused at China within the South China Sea, the encounter occurred close to Sabina Shoal, a maritime characteristic not occupied by China. Thus, that is additionally the primary time that the PLA Navy (PLA) formally admitted that it “dispatched forces to trace and monitor the U.S. vessel” close to a characteristic China doesn’t occupy.
This new form of shut encounter might reveal that the Chinese language authorities is upgrading its technique to reply to perceived U.S. naval intrusions within the South China Sea. On the similar time, the incident might also function a warning to the Philippines, which considers Sabina Shoal to be part of its Unique Financial Zone (EEZ). These interpretations stay tentative, and non-exclusive, however they make the encounter price analyzing past the fast trade of official statements.
Disputes Between China and the U.S. over “Freedom of Navigation” of Warships
The United States holds that the proper to sail and function its navy vessels “wherever customary worldwide legislation permits” is “a long-standing nationwide curiosity.” The U.S. navy makes use of FONOPs to problem maritime claims and restrictions that it considers extreme.
China, against this, argues that freedom of navigation can’t be invoked to justify actions that it views as threatening its territorial integrity or safety, together with overseas warships’ operations close to maritime options over which China asserts sovereignty. Beijing considers the intentional “intrusion” of warships into its claimed territorial sea to be “hegemonic freedom of navigation.” China argues U.S. FONOPs don’t have any place in up to date worldwide legislation.
A semi-official analysis report revealed by the China Institute for Marine Affairs underneath the Ministry of Pure Sources in August 2025 highlighted this challenge. The report concluded that the “U.S. Freedom of Navigation lacks a foundation in worldwide legislation and significantly distorts the interpretation and improvement of worldwide legislation.” These competing positions have underpinned repeated Chinese language protests towards U.S. naval operations within the South China Sea.
Notably, information studies of the Charleston’s October 20 operation didn’t formally describe it as a FONOP. The U.S. spokesperson’s assertion as a substitute emphasised that “all nations take pleasure in freedom of navigation and different lawful makes use of of the ocean on this space.” That language is according to Washington’s broader place on maritime entry, but it surely doesn’t set up that the operation was a formally designated FONOP or establish the precise authorized declare, if any, that the vessel supposed to problem.
The excellence issues: a naval transit, a routine operation, and a FONOP might overlap in observe, however they aren’t essentially interchangeable descriptions of an operation’s goal.
Why Sabina Shoal Is Distinct
U.S. FONOPs typically establish a specific maritime declare or restriction they search to problem. For example, america explicitly labeled a earlier operation that passed off on August 13, 2025, close to Scarborough Shoal as a FONOP supposed to problem Chinese language home laws requiring prior authorization for overseas warships to enter China’s territorial sea. In such instances, the acknowledged authorized goal gives a comparatively clear foundation for decoding the operation and anticipating a Chinese language response. Within the August 2025 case, the PLA mentioned it had “organized forces to lawfully monitor, monitor, challenge warnings, and expel the U.S. warship.”
Sabina Shoal presents a distinct scenario for a variety of causes. Initially, in contrast to Scarborough Shoal, Sabina Shoal was not among the many contested maritime options within the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award.
On the similar time, there isn’t a mutual understanding between China and the Philippines on the authorized standing of the shoal and its surrounding waters. The USA and the Philippines regard Sabina Shoal as a low-tide elevation that can’t, in its personal proper, generate a territorial sea. They thus regard the encompassing waters as a part of the Philippines’ EEZ.
Against this, the Chinese language authorities disputes that Sabina Shoal (identified in Chinese language as Xianbin Jiao) is a low-tide elevation. In reality, a “Survey Report on the Coral Reef Ecosystem of Xianbin Jiao” revealed by the Ministry of Pure Sources of China in August 2024, mentioned that there are at the very least three naturally shaped cays above water at excessive tide. Accordingly, China considers Sabina Shoal to be a rock that may declare a territorial sea. This will likely clarify why China accused the Charleston of an “unlawful intrusion” into the “adjoining waters” of Sabina Shoal.
Nonetheless, essentially the most peculiar situation at Sabina Shoal is that this maritime characteristic has by no means been formally occupied by China, due to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Events within the South China Sea (DOC), which prohibits “inhabitation” on beforehand unoccupied maritime options.
But in Beijing’s view, Sabina Shoal is a part of the “Nansha Qundao” (Spratly Islands), which as a complete belongs to China. That may be the explanation that China by no means formally claimed any territorial sea round its occupied maritime options comparable to Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao), Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao), or Cuarteron Reef (Huayang Jiao). As an alternative, Beijing claims “indeniable territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights and pursuits” inside the entire of the Spratly Islands group.
The anomaly surrounding the character of the Charleston’s operation makes it tough to interpret. It’s unclear if america supposed to problem a Chinese language declare to maritime entitlements round Sabina Shoal or a requirement for prior authorization of transiting its territorial sea. If, nevertheless, the operation was as a substitute supposed to reveal help for the Philippines, the importance would lie much less in a selected authorized problem than within the strategic sign conveyed by a U.S. naval presence close to a flashpoint within the China-Philippines dispute.
A Doable Warning to the Philippines
The encounter occurred amid heightened tensions between China and the Philippines. On October 14, Chinese language Ambassador to the Philippines Jing Quan reportedly remarked that China might “simply win a battle” towards the Philippines if it selected to make use of drive. The comment adopted a critical confrontation between a Chinese language Coast Guard vessel and a Philippine authorities vessel at Sabina Shoal on September 18.
In reality, because the starting of October, at the very least eight shut encounters between China and the Philippines have occurred throughout the South China Sea and Luzon Strait, in accordance with Reuters. This wider context helps clarify why the Philippines may view the Charleston’s presence at Sabina Shoal as an indication of U.S. help, even when the operation was not formally recognized as a FONOP towards Chinese language maritime claims.
China’s response, alternatively, may very well be interpreted as a contemporary warning to the Philippines. By dispatching naval forces to trace and monitor the U.S. warship at an unoccupied maritime characteristic for the primary time, China showcased its dedication to guard its claimed rights and pursuits at Sabina Shoal.
This upgraded response additionally sends an easy warning to the Philippines that any additional provocation at Sabina Shoal, with or with out help from the U.S., will predictably obtain an escalated Chinese language response.
The Outlook of China-U.S. Naval Encounters within the South China Sea
Whereas worldwide legislation gives a standard framework for maritime conduct, its interpretation and software stay deeply contested by main powers. The USA advocates its naval operations as a protection of freedom of navigation, whereas China views U.S. naval operations close to South China Sea maritime options as challenges to its territorial sovereignty and safety. And not using a shared understanding of the authorized and strategic implications of such operations, related encounters are prone to recur.
The outlook is subsequently one among persistent competitors accompanied by dangers of unintended escalation. As each navies preserve a major presence within the South China Sea, shut encounters – together with, as on this case – China-U.S. naval encounters at maritime options not occupied by China, might change into more and more frequent, significantly amid intensifying Philippine-U.S. safety cooperation. Even when neither facet seeks confrontation, miscalculation, communication failures, or home political stress might flip a “routine operation” right into a critical disaster.
But confrontation is just not inevitable. Each China and america have sturdy incentives to forestall tactical incidents from escalating into broader navy battle. Sustaining efficient navy communication channels, strengthening incident-management mechanisms, and clarifying operational protocols ought to subsequently stay priorities. Equally essential is a willingness to handle maritime disagreements via diplomacy and worldwide legislation relatively than relying solely on navy assertions such because the FONOPs.
Finally, the importance of the Sabina Shoal naval encounter lies not merely within the actions of the 2 navies, however in what it reveals about the way forward for maritime order within the South China Sea. Whether or not such encounters change into catalysts for escalation or alternatives for improved disaster administration will rely on the strategic selections made in Beijing and Washington.