After holding extremely controversial elections in December 2025 and January 2026, Min Aung Hlaing, the previous head of Myanmar’s navy junta and now the nation’s president, started to make official visits to neighboring nations. Financial diplomacy has been a key theme in almost all his visits, notably to China, Thailand, and Malaysia, the place he traveled with representatives of Myanmar’s main enterprise conglomerates.
These visits comprised commerce negotiations, funding promotion and enterprise conferences, suggesting an effort to strengthen an economic system that has weakened dramatically for the reason that navy coup of 2021. But the regime’s home financial insurance policies proceed to hinder the financial cooperation efforts Myanmar needs to encourage. With out addressing these contradictions – between abroad commitments and home restrictions – the regime’s financial diplomacy is unlikely to result in a nationwide financial restoration.
These contradictions are rooted within the pursuits of highly effective home curiosity teams. In Myanmar, political authorities and enterprise elites fashioned a small coalition that controls entry to commerce and funding. Subsequently, their pursuits in sustaining restrictions on imports, international foreign money, and commerce revenues maintain home restrictions that undermine the regime’s implementation of international financial commitments.
Myanmar’s precarious post-coup financial situations and ongoing conflicts have additional compounded these political constraints and undermined its skill to ship on commerce commitments. Subsequently, the regime’s ongoing efforts to increase financial relations with neighboring nations must be analyzed in mild of its continued reliance on home financial controls.
Whereas visiting China from June 15 to 19, Min Aung Hlaing and China’s chief Xi Jinping agreed to speed up ongoing China–Myanmar Financial Hall initiatives and to reinforce bilateral commerce by means of yuan–kyat settlements. Throughout his subsequent go to to Thailand on August 6-7, Min Aung Hlaing and Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul agreed to strengthen bilateral commerce relations, setting a $12 billion bilateral commerce goal (albeit and not using a timeline). Each side additionally agreed to ease current regulatory limitations and facilitate cross-border commerce. In the meantime, through the Malaysia-Myanmar financial dialogue in Kuala Lumpur on October 7, Min Aung Hlaing additionally known as for funding from Malaysian firms in Myanmar, notably in meals processing, manufacturing, logistics, and particular financial zones.
Implementing these proposals would require companies to acquire international foreign money with the intention to import equipment and uncooked supplies from abroad. In actuality, the regime nonetheless closely regulates imports and international foreign money, and imposes import restrictions to keep up depleted international foreign money reserves. Such regulatory measures would due to this fact hinder the implementation of agreed commerce and funding commitments.
One other key difficulty that might complicate abroad commitments is Myanmar’s weakened financial place. After the 2021 navy coup, Myanmar’s economic system skilled a pointy decline as a result of exacerbated battle, contemporary sanctions, and the collapse of investor confidence. The World Financial institution’s June 2026 Financial Monitor on Myanmar estimated a 2 % contraction within the economic system in comparison with the earlier fiscal 12 months, with an inflation charge of 24.6 per cent in April 2026. This evaluation additionally mirrored the federal government’s heavy administrative burden and uneven coverage implementation. Though some financial actions have begun to stabilize, the World Financial institution famous that many companies proceed to face electrical energy shortages, weak demand and rising manufacturing prices amid the continuing battle and the 2025 earthquake. Beneath these circumstances, companies focus extra on survival than on growth. Such situations have established a tough working atmosphere for worldwide buyers.
Regardless of its commitments to financial cooperation and strengthening commerce ties, the regime continues to limit the commerce it has promised to facilitate. The March 2026 U.S. Worldwide Commerce Administration’s industrial information highlights the unpredictable import license approvals and non-automatic licensing for border commerce. Shortly after Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand, Myanmar authorities stalled shipments of frozen meals and different imports from the Tachilek-Mae Sai Border on September 21, reportedly citing requirements checks and unpaid taxes. These restrictions disrupted border commerce, prompted congested visitors, and led to the buildup of commodities on the border. This disruption illustrates the difficulties of implementing bilateral commerce commitments amid unpredictable home commerce insurance policies and enforcement.
Comparable restrictions on border commerce are additionally occurring on the China-Myanmar border. Though China just lately eased restrictions at some crossings managed by ethnic armed organizations, the imports face severe challenges in accessing Myanmar’s home markets. Since August, the navy and mixed departmental groups have tightened border commerce, hindering the casual circulate of imports to the home market. Such obstructions undermine the border commerce the regime seeks to advertise with China and improve uncertainty for companies concerning imported provides.
Political motivations behind such restrictions have develop into evident just lately. After Operation 1027, an offensive launched by key ethnic armed teams in late 2023, many of the border commerce routes and key buying and selling services alongside the China-Myanmar border fell below the management of the ethnic armed organizations. On October 28, Min Aung Hlaing known as for motion towards the continuing casual border commerce, citing its position in strengthening the capabilities of armed teams. His comment additionally highlights the significance of border commerce in Myanmar’s ongoing civil battle, and the truth that such restrictions serve navy and income aims alongside international trade administration. Subsequently, the facilitation of commerce outdoors of Naypyidaw’s management contradicts its efforts to disclaim sources to armed opponents.
The restrictive measures on border commerce and imports additionally align with the pursuits of Myanmar’s home financial elites. Since 2021, the regime has tightened management over imports and international foreign money, leaving many companies to depend on administrative approvals for industrial actions. Importers now face license-approval limits, unsure ready durations, and cost restrictions. On this allow economic system, entry to official permissions has develop into a industrial benefit and a key technique of securing entry to provides and markets. Merchants advised The Irrawaddy that import licenses for the reopening of the Thai-Myanmar border commerce in June 2026 had been awarded by means of a patronage community managed by Vice-President Nyo Noticed, who can also be answerable for approving the usage of international foreign money. For enterprise elites benefiting from present restrictions and controlling a monopoly on imports, easing restrictions might carry better competitors and scale back their benefits. Such elites might search international partnerships whereas retaining home management and limiting expectations of broader financial good points by means of abroad commitments.
Regardless of restrictive insurance policies, crafting shut financial relations with neighboring nations might create new commerce and funding alternatives for sure companies. Myanmar’s policymakers ought to implement predictable and clear import licensing standards, constant approval timelines, and eased international foreign money restrictions. Such measures would assist to comprehend the abroad commerce commitments agreed in latest months. In the meantime, neighboring counterparts ought to push the implementation of agreed commitments to enhance companies’ skill to buy provides, make international foreign money funds, and ship items to home markets.
Nonetheless, prospects for commerce normalization and financial restoration stay unsure. Such outcomes depend upon the regime’s political will and talent to reconcile its financial commitments with home elite pursuits and safety priorities. Ongoing commerce restrictions are nonetheless obstructing income to armed opponents and preserving benefits for well-connected enterprise elites. Beneath such circumstances, administrative reforms alone are unlikely to beat the political pursuits influencing ongoing commerce restrictions. Subsequently, sturdy political progress that addresses the continuing political disaster and competing management over commerce routes is important for commerce normalization and financial restoration.